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This paper studies whether the degree of female representation in Swedish local councils
affects local public expenditure patterns. Theoretically, the individual preferences of elected
representatives may impact public expenditure if full policy commitment is not feasible. To
empirically address the question I first analyze the preferences expressed by elected local
council representatives using survey data. This permits me to make precise predictions about
the effects of female representation on spending. The subsequent panel  study on the
composition of public spending in Swedish municipalities supports the predictions derived
from the survey.
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1. Introduction
Do all groups have to be represented in elected assemblies for their interests to be taken into
account? In the public debate this is often claimed to be the case. Yet if political
representation is necessary for having one’s interests taken into account, it is implicitly
assumed that the elected representative, at least to some degree, can pursue his or her own
interests. Women are often referred to as an under-represented group in elected assemblies. In
the year 2000, e.g., only two out of nine national parliament members worldwide were
women (Norris (2001)). Many countries consider this to be a major problem and various
strategies, including affirmative action and quotas, are aimed at boosting female
representation in elected assemblies.
Theoretically, there is no clear answer as to whether the elected representative’s gender is of
importance for policy choices. An instance when identity is of no  importance for policy
choices is when political candidates and parties can commit to policy platforms ahead of the
election. If politicians can commit to policy choices then electoral incentives will cause
candidates to choose a policy vector preferred by a majority of voters. Typical for these
models is the decisive role of the median voter (see e.g. Downs (1957)). This assumes,
however, that voters and politicians are able to write down a full set of state contingent policy
contracts prior to the election and that some institutions enforce these campaign promises.
Elected politicians, however, always have important powers that are partly unchecked.
Unbiased enforcement is rarely observed in reality. In such cases, policy choices are sensitive
to the legislator’s policy preferences (see e.g. Alesina (1988)).
When the electorate delegates policy decisions to political agents who are motivated by self-
interest, and enforcement of electoral campaign promises is not possible, there is an agency
problem between voters and their representatives (Persson et al. (2000)). Elections and
political institutions may discipline political agents and if the office holder wishes to remain
in office the electorate can hold the incumbent accountable for policy choices (Ferejohn
(1986)). Yet politicians will still have some discretionary power over policy choices. It is
therefore theoretically plausible that politicians’ preferences affect policy choices; i.e. the
bargaining strength of a group of politicians with similar preferences will matter for the
allocation of resources.3
There is also empirical evidence that the median voter model may not be an appropriate
description of the political process. Levitt (1996) shows in a study of U.S senators that
personal preferences have a major impact on senators’ voting patterns in Congress. Moreover,
several studies have shown that gender is an indicator of policy priorities. Female legislators
tend to be more liberal than men and are more likely to express concerns about social policy
issues (see e.g. Thomas (1991, 1994), Oskarson and Wängnerud (1995) and Setzer, Newmann
and Voorhees Leighton (1997)). In a study of Swedish MPs, Esaiasson and Holmberg (1993)
find that female MPs were significantly more positive towards daycare centers and an
ecological society.
This study investigates if female representation shapes actual policy choices in Swedish local
governments. Swedish local government is an interesting object of research since it is a
representative democracy in which the budgetary process does not include a popular vote
about the budget’s size or content. Moreover, local governments enjoy considerable autonomy
from national government. In fact, Pettersson-Lidbom (2000, 2001) finds that parties matter
for spending in Swedish municipalities, implying the median voter model has limited support.
Much of the empirical research on the determinants of public policy has however used the
median voter model and focused on the relationship between the demographic characteristics
of a political jurisdiction and the services provided by its government (see e.g. Cutler,
Elmendorf and Zeckhauser (1993) and Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1997)). This paper tries to
broaden the research on the determinants of public policy by examining the impact of
legislator identity on public policy.
Earlier studies of legislator identity as a determinant of policy choices include Sorensen
(1995), Pande (1999), Besley and Case (2001) and Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2001). When
investigating the effect of reservation policies on policy choices in India, Pande (1999) finds
some results suggesting that reserved places for minorities affect targeted transfers and
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2001) find that mandatory representation for women affects local-
level spending patterns. Using panel data for U.S. states, Besley and Case (2001) find that
female representation increased spending on family assistance and strengthens child support.
Sorensen (1995) first asks politicians what their preferences are and then investigates whether
the number of politicians of a certain group has an effect on actual spending decisions. His4
results are ambiguous. Thus, even if there are differences in preferences, they do not
necessarily have any effect on actual policy.
Using survey data on the preferences of politicians in local governments, I first investigate if
and how the preferences of men and women differ. This approach allows me to derive a set of
precise hypothesis about the effects of gender on policy choices. This is of great merit: instead
of postulating à priori in what way men and women’s preferences differ, I derive clear
predictions about the effect of female representation on spending from the preference study. I
then analyze the actual allocation of spending in all Swedish municipalities during the period
1988-1997, taking potential dynamics and endogeneity problems into account. The results
indicate that the share of women in a local council indeed has a significant effect on spending
decisions. As predicted by the preference study, a larger share of women in the majority
increases spending on childcare relative to elderly care. Moreover, increased female
representation in those municipalities ruled by left-wing parties has a positive impact on
spending on education relative to elderly care. No such effect is found in right-wing parties.
At a more general level, the results indicate that legislator identity influences policy choices.
The paper is organized as follows. I first (section 2) examine the relationship between gender
and preferences using survey data on the elected representatives in 28 Swedish municipalities.
Then (section 3) I study the effect of female representation on actual local public expenditure
in all Swedish municipalities, using the predictions derived in section two. Results are
presented for both the within and GMM-estimator. Section four addresses the question of
causality using an instrumental variable approach. Since causality is an important issue in this
type of study the section receives considerable attention. In section five I study the effect of
gender on the municipality's responses to different shocks, and finally section six concludes.
2.  How do men and women’s preferences differ?
To obtain predictions about the effect of female representation on policy choices, men and
women’s preferences need to differ in a systematic way. In order to establish possible gender
differences in preferences, I employ a unique data set on the preferences expressed by elected5
representatives in Swedish municipalities in 1993.
1 The study focuses on spending on elderly
care, education and childcare. There are three main reasons for choosing these sectors. First of
all they constitute the lion’s share of municipal spending
2; secondly, the availability of data is
good; and thirdly, the municipalities are almost the sole providers of these services.
2.1. Data
Elected representatives in 28 municipalities (about 10 percent of the local councils) and 4
counties were asked to participate in the survey.
3 Since the focus is on the local council, only
respondents who are members or replacement deputies in the local council are included,
leaving me with around 1035 observations. The primary purpose of the original survey was to
study elected representatives' views on their political role and working routines in the local
councils. However, the data collected also includes background information on gender, age,
party affiliation, participation in organizations and position in the elected council. And most
importantly, for my purpose, it includes the politicians’ views on certain issues and in what
areas they thought that the municipality should do more.
For each area, the respondent could choose from three different answers: “it is important to do
more than the municipality is doing now”; “the municipality’s efforts are sufficient”; or “the
municipality's efforts can be reduced”.
4 The answers will be interpreted as the politicians’
spending preferences for different sectors. Since municipalities in Sweden have power over
the size of budget, and no budget constraint was built into the questions, it is possible that
some politicians answered that the municipality should do more (or less) in all areas. To
remedy this problem, differences between answers are used and ordered into five categories.
For example, the variable Childcare/Elderly care will take value 1 if the politician states that
more should be done in elderly care and less in childcare. It will take value 2 both if he/she
indicates it is important to do more in elderly care while work in childcare is sufficient, and if
                                                       
1 The data set is handled and distributed by The Swedish Social Science Data Service at Gothenburg University.
Henry Bäck, Department of Social Science, Stockholm University, originally collected the material in
“Kommunalpolitikerundersökningen” 1993.  Neither Swedish Social Science Data Service, nor Henry Bäck bear
any responsibility for the analysis, or interpretation of the data as presented in this paper.
The results of the preferences study should be representative for the period since a lack of data will restrict the
following study of actual public expenditure to the ten-year period 1988-1997.
2 Over 70 percent of local public spending is spent on these three sectors (www.scb.se).
3 The municipalities were chosen by the original researcher to mirror the demographic, economic and political
differences across municipalities in Sweden. Female representation is slightly stronger in the municipalities
included in the survey than the ones outside of the survey. However, the means are not statistically different at
the 10 percent confidence level.6
he/she answers that elderly care spending is sufficient and can be reduced in childcare. If the
respondent states that he/she would like to do more in all areas, it will be interpreted as this
person does not place higher priority on any one area in relation to another and the variable
Childcare/Elderly care will take value 3, and so on.
As can be seen in the summary statistics shown in Table A:1, the mean of the variable
Elderly/Child is 2.672. On average, elderly care is thus regarded as a slightly more important
sector then childcare. Whenever the mean is lower then 3, the sector in the numerator is, on
average, regarded as less important than the sector in the denominator. Judging by the means,
politicians would like to spend more on elderly care and education, at the expense of
childcare.
2.2. Results
The effects of gender on the stated preferences are examined in an ordered logit model,
controlling for age, party affiliation and municipality. The results presented in Table 1 show
that there is a clear effect of gender. Women, relative to men, regard childcare and education
as more important sectors than elderly care. Furthermore, both age and party affiliation are
clearly correlated with preferences. In comparison to right-wing politicians, left-wing
politicians rank childcare as the most important area. As expected, older politicians, relative
to younger ones, think that elderly care is more important than other sectors. Women in local
councils are on average younger than their male colleagues are. The results, however, show
that there is an effect of gender even after controlling for age. Including a dummy for each
municipality does if anything strengthen the result. The dummy should pick up municipality
specific factors, such as the municipality’s earlier spending pattern and its age structure, that
can potentially influence the politicians’ preferences. Then again, regardless of where the
politicians come from, gender is correlated with preferences.
5
[Table 1 here]
                                                                                                                                                                            
4 See Appendix for the exact question.
5 The Wald statistic is always statistically significant in the samples including municipality dummies. Excluding
the dummies, however, reduces its value in several specifications. In particular, the model does then not perform
well in the estimations presented in Table 2, column 2 , and Table 3, column 2.7
The sample is then divided along party lines to check whether the effects are different in left-
and right-wing parties.
6 Table 2 and 3 present the results for left- and right-wing parties
respectively. The effect of gender in left-wing parties is the same as for the total sample (see
Table 1). In right-wing parties, however, women and men do not express different opinions
concerning the relative importance of education contra elderly care.
[Table 2 and 3 here]
To sum up, the gender effect on the ranking of childcare verses elderly care appears to exist in
both samples although the effect differs somewhat between left-wing and right-wing
politicians. In left-wing parties, gender seems to affect the importance of childcare and
education relative to elderly care. In right-wing parties, however, the main difference is the
preference for childcare relative to the other sectors.
Due to the construction of the independent variables some variation in preferences may be
lost. Specifically, some respondents may have different preferences over the two sectors but
state they prefer more (or less) spending in both sectors. In that case, my variable will indicate
that the respondent does not prefer any sector relative to the other, suggesting that the data
fails to pick-up all the variation in preferences. To find out more about this effect I study the
gender profile for those cases where the respondent prefers more (or less) spending in both
sectors. Interestingly, women are overrepresented (underrepresented) as respondents
preferring more (less) spending in both sectors. Thus women, relative to men, favor increased
spending in all three sectors.
The study of politicians’ preferences indicates certain differences between men and women. If
politicians can pursue their own interests, the strength of women in the local council should
be reflected in the municipalities’ spending decisions. Table 4 summarizes the hypotheses that
will be tested using data for actual municipal expenditures.
[Table 4 here]
                                                       
6 Parties categorized as 'left-wing' are the Left Party and the Social Democratic Party, and 'right-wing' are the
Moderate Party, the Liberal Party, the Christian Democratic Party, the Centre Party and New Democracy. This
categorization follows Petersson (1992).8
Notice that it would be incorrect to interpret the above result as saying that women regard, for
example, childcare as the service with highest priority; what it says is that women regard
childcare as more important than men do. As a matter of fact, both female and male
politicians express preferences for more spending on elderly care at the expense of childcare.
Thus, if the elected politicians could affect policy in accordance with these preferences it
should be reflected in a trend: over time, more resources should be allocated to elderly care
and education at the expense of childcare.
3. Local public spending
3.1 Object of study  Swedish local governments
Section two established a relationship between spending preferences and gender. The next
step is to find out if politicians’ preferences are important for actual spending. The object of
the empirical study is Swedish municipal spending, which constitutes more than 40 percent of
Swedish public spending. Local governments in Sweden are interesting units for study of
collective choice since they enjoy significant independence from national government. In fact
they have the constitutional right of self-governance.  Moreover, several empirical studies
have shown that they indeed act independently from national government (see e.g. Pettersson-
Lidbom (2000 and 2001)). Another attractive feature is that local governments, contrary to
country level studies, operate in the same political framework, i.e., politicians are likely to
have roughly the same effect in all municipalities.
This study covers 278 municipalities in Sweden and spans 1988-1997.
7 As mentioned earlier,
it focuses on spending on elderly care, education and childcare. Since the preference study
only provides predictions about the effects on the relative spending on different sectors, the
ratios of spending will be used as dependent variables.
3.2 Specification of empirical model
                                                       
7 It includes all municipalities except for the ones that were split or created during the period, and three
municipalities with responsibilities usually handled by the county council.9
Empirically, the purpose is to estimate the impact of female politicians on municipality
spending patterns, while controlling for the municipality’s demographic composition. This
allows me to examine whether the politician’s identity matters for policy choices. It can also
be seen as a weak test of different political economy models: if politicians can commit to
policy, then the bargaining strength of women in the local council should not affect policy
decisions. With incomplete commitment, however, variations in political representation
should have an effect.
How should we measure the bargaining strengths of elected representatives in local councils?
One major determinant of individual representatives’ bargaining strength is the structure of
the decision-making process. If the ruling parties alone determine the allocation of resources,
only the bargaining strength of women in the majority is important for policy decisions. I will
use the share of women in the majority as one proxy for women’s bargaining strength when
decisions are assumed to be taken by majority parties alone. An alternative view of the
decision process is that all elected representatives can affect resource allocation. This amounts
to assuming that all elected representatives have some bargaining power in the budget
process, possibly because they can highlight these issues in council meetings and in the media
even though they are not part of the majority. In this case the share of women in the council is
the appropriate proxy. The two proxies are of course highly correlated, but hopefully the two
hypotheses about the decision making process can be separated empirically.
8 Another issue is
that the new assembly is gathered shortly before the following year’s budget is decided upon.
It is possible that the effect of increased women’s representation does not show up until the
next budget.
The study of politicians’ preferences in section 2 clearly indicated that the representative’s
age is correlated with spending. Sadly, no panel data is available for the age composition of
the local councils, and therefore it is not possible to analyze the effect of politician’s ages on
spending decisions. Since the women are younger than the men, it may lead me to falsely
attribute effects on spending to gender instead of age. But even if that were to be the case, it
would still mean that the identity of the politician matters for policy choices.
9
                                                       
8 The correlation between share of women on the council and share of women in the majority is 0.834.
9 There is data on the age composition of the local council available for one cross-section. Studying the effect of
politicians’ age on these data give conflicting result. It seems as municipalities ruled by older politicians in a left-
wing majority spend less on childcare relative to elderly care. However, there is some evidence of the opposite,10
When trying to explain spending on different services, one must try and control for
differences in the need for the service. Since services such as childcare, education and elderly
care are directed towards certain age groups, it is natural to control for demographic structure.
It is also possible that large age groups can exert political pressure on the local council to
spend more on a service that benefits that particular group. In a typical median voter model,
for example, it is of great importance for the spending pattern which service the median voter
benefits the most from (see e.g. Strömberg (1999)). When estimating the ratio of spending on
childcare to spending on elderly care, for example, the following explanatory variables are
used: share of population between the ages of 0-6; share of population between the ages of
65-79; and share of the population older then 80. The percentage of left-wing votes will also
be included, since it is likely to affect the municipality’s allocation of resources. The rationale
is twofold. First, given that politicians can affect resource allocation, and that party affiliation
has been shown to correlate with preferences, the bargaining strength of the party should have
an effect. Second, the votes cast for left-wing parties may also reflect the preferences of the
population.
An important question concerns problems of simultaneity: there may be an omitted variable,
such as a community-specific preference for equality, affecting both spending decisions and
female representation. The issue of possible simultaneity will be addressed below.  Note,
however, that voters in Sweden can not directly show their preferences for a female or male
politician by voting for that candidate. In the Swedish system
10, voters vote for a party list,
not a candidate, and a voter has virtually no power to affect the names on the list, the order of
which is decided entirely by the party. Moreover, parties on the local level have been under
pressure from the national level to increase the share of women on the party list.
As mentioned earlier, the demographic composition of the electorate has also been used to
describe the identity of the median voter in empirical studies. Thus, age variables pick up both
cost differences and median voter effects. Female participation rates will also be included to
pick up further cost differences, since the need for childcare should be greater when many
women work outside of the home. Population density is included in case it affects the relative
                                                                                                                                                                            
that municipalities with older politicians increased spending on childcare and education at the expense of elderly
care. Thus, the results suggest that the possible effect of gender is not likely to be due to age effects.
10 In the 1998 election, and outside the time period of this study, incremental change was introduced that for the
first time enabled the electorate to vote for an individual candidate.11
price of the different services. To control for further possible median voter effects, a battery of
other variables will be included, such as the share of women in the population, the share of
women in the population with higher education, and municipality mean income. For an
overview of the variables, see their summary statistics in Table A:2. The general idea is that it
if policy decisions are entirely decided by the electorate, only variables describing the
municipality’s demographic composition should explain the spending pattern, and the
composition of the local council should have no explanatory power.
According to Table 4 there are three equations to estimate, one for each spending ratio. The
general specification is:
yit =β zit +γ Xit + λt + vi + εit
where  yit  denotes a particular spending ratio in a municipality in a specific year; zit the
representation of women in the local council; and Xit    is the vector of control variables
mentioned above. For the rest, λt is a time-specific effect, constant over municipalities, vi is a
municipal-specific effect, constant over time, and εit is the usual residual.
The advantage of using panel data is, of course, that we may hold constant municipality-
specific and time-specific influences on spending. Municipality fixed effects control for time
invariant differences across municipalities that may influence policy choices. Year effects
should pick up two types of effects. First, if politicians can act according to their own
preferences, the trend should comply with the politicians’ average preferences. The analysis
of preferences in section 2 focused on the difference between men and women. For example,
women, relative to men, were found to regard childcare as a more important area than elderly
care. Both men and women, however, did in fact state elderly care to be the highest priority
sector. We therefore expect that over time municipalities will allocate a larger share of budget
to elderly care and that the year dummies will pick up this effect. Second, the year effects will
also take into account any impact on the policy outcome of common shocks to the
municipalities. Examples may include changes in laws and changes in those services the
municipality has to provide. Then again, the use of fixed municipality and year effects also
have drawbacks; while they may correctly measure left-out variables, they may falsely cause12
me to attribute changes in spending patterns to fixed effects that should be attributed to
variables, such as women’s representation, that vary across municipalities and time.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Fixed effects
Table 5 presents the basic panel regressions for the full set of municipalities, using the share
of women in the majority lagged one period as a proxy for women’s representation. As the
municipality specific effects are correlated with the explanatory variables the random effects
assumption is not appropriate, which makes the within estimator the preferred estimator.
According to the preference study in section 2, the effect of women’s representation in the
majority should affect spending on childcare and education relative to elderly care and have
no impact on spending on childcare relative to education. The results indeed suggest that
female representation has a positive effect on spending on childcare and education relative to
elderly care. However, it also has an effect on spending on childcare relative to education,
which is not in accordance with the prediction from section two.
With regards to the controls, a larger share of elderly in the population has a significant
impact on spending, favoring elderly care relative to childcare and education. The demand for
childcare is positively affected by women’s workforce participation rate, while demand for
education is positively correlated with the share of educated women in the municipality.
Another interesting result is that the share of left-wing votes enters with the sign predicted in
section 2. A larger share of left-wing politicians increases spending on childcare relative to
elderly care and education, as does mean income, while population density and the share of
women in the municipality have no impact on the relative spending levels in the three sectors.
[Table 5 here]
Is it the representation in the ruling majority or the representation in the council that is of
importance for the allocation of resources? Table 6 presents the result when using the two
different proxies for women’s bargaining power. The coefficients for the control variables are
suppressed to save space. Both proxies have an effect on spending decisions. So far, it is
difficult to say anything about the decision process, i.e., if the share of women in the council13
or the share of women in the majority matters for the allocation of resources. Or if the impact
of changes in female representation is instantaneous or take a year to show.
[Table 6 here]
3.3.2 Dynamic specification.
Earlier studies estimating the demand for local public services in a median voter framework
have typically assumed exogenous regressors and a static set-up. Dynamics may be present
since the adjustment to changes in demand might be sluggish. Many of the explanatory
variables may well be endogenous due to migration and other factors.
11 Recent work in this
area has shown that regressors may well be endogenous and the adjustment process may well
be sluggish (see e.g. Bailey and Connolly (1998) and Dahlberg and Jacob (2000)). When
estimating a model that has endogenous regressors and/or is dynamic, the within estimator is
no longer appropriate. In fact, the within estimator will be biased and inconsistent in a
dynamic set-up unless the panel consists of many time periods. When estimating dynamic
models one can use transformations that allow the use of lagged endogenous and
predetermined variables as instruments for the transformed equations. Efficient GMM of this
type are discussed in, for example, Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998).
Here I make use of the GMM system estimator described in Blundell and Bond (1998).
The results using the dynamic panel data estimator are presented in Table 7. Only the results
using female representation for the previous period are displayed, since the other proxies are
never statistically significant at conventional significance levels. Again, the other explanatory
variables are suppressed to save space. All coefficients are from the first-step estimations,
since studies have found that the second-step standard errors tend to be biased downward (see
e.g. Blundell and Bond (1998)). The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions is used to
control the model specification and the validity of the instruments. Since this test tends to
over-reject in the presence of heteroscedasticity, the two-step estimator should be used to
evaluate the specification. The consistency of the GMM estimator hinges heavily upon the
                                                       
11 If there is Tiebout migration, income and demographic structure may, for example, be endogenous. In
particular, Dahlberg and Jacob (2000) have shown in a study of demand for public services in Swedish
municipalities that demographic variables, income and population density are not strictly exogenous. On the
other hand, Ahlin and Johansson (2001) find no evidence of Tiebout sorting in a study of the demand for local
public school expenditures in Sweden using survey data.14
assumption of no second-order autocorrelation in the first-differences errors. Therefore, Table
7 also shows the test statistic of an AR(2) test.
In specification A all the explanatory variables are considered to be exogenous. According to
the Sargan test the model is correctly specified and the instruments are valid in the two last
columns but not in the first one. To remedy the problem in the first specification all regressors
are treated as predetermined (specification B). Yet the result stays qualitatively the same. The
results show that a significant dynamic effect is present in all specifications. Further, only
female representation from the previous period seems to have any effect on spending patterns.
There seems to be a positive effect of female representation on spending on childcare and
education relative to elderly care. However, only the effect in the first column is statistically
significant. To judge the size of the effect, consider a 10 percent increase of the share of
women in the ruling majority. This leads to an immediate 0.8 percent increase in resources
spent on childcare relative to elderly care while the long-term effect is estimated at 1.6
percent.
[Table 7 here]
Next, I let the impact of female representation vary across left- and right-wing majorities to
investigate the hypothesis more closely. As the relative preferences between men and women
differ across left- and right wing parties, the impact should differ across majorities. The
results in Table 8 certainly lend more support for the hypotheses tested in this paper. As
predicted, there is a positive effect of women’s representation in both left- and right-wing
majorities on the resources spent on childcare relative to elderly care. There is no effect on
spending on childcare relative to education, and a positive effect on spending on education
relative to elderly care only in municipalities ruled by a left-wing majority.
12
[Table 8 here]
How large is the effect of female representation? Consider a municipality ruled by a left-wing
majority in 1988 and with a median share of women in the majority. Assume that this
municipality is still on the median in the end of the period. This means that the municipality
has raised its female representation by 55.3 percent (from 31.0 to 48.1 percent women in the15
majority). This implies a short-run increase of spending on childcare relative to elderly care of
4.8 percent and education relative to elderly care of 2.0 percent. The long-run effect is 9.6
percent on childcare relative to elderly care and 2.9 percent on education relative to elderly
care. Another way to judge the effect is to consider a municipality with female representation
at the 25th percentile a certain year and see how large the effect on spending would be if it
increased female representation to the size of the 75th percentile. In 1993, for example, this
experiment would entail an increase from 32.8 to 44.2 percent, i.e. a 34.8 percent increase of
the share of women in the majority. The result − a direct effect of 3.0 percent and a long-run
effect of 6.1 percent increase of spending on childcare relative to elderly care. Spending on
education relative to elderly care would go up with 1.3 percent in the short run and by 1.8
percent in the long run.
The demographic variables enter roughly as expected in the dynamic specification. The share
of left-wing votes only has a positive effect on spending on childcare relative to education and
not, as in the fixed-effects estimation, on spending on childcare relative to the other sectors.
Women’s participation in the workforce increases spending on childcare and elderly care at
the expense of spending on education. For the rest, the share of educated women, population
density and mean wage have a positive effect on spending on childcare. Including dummies
for left- and right-wing majorities does not alter the result. The other proxy for female
representation – the share of women in the council – is never significant in GMM estimations.
Thus it is the share of women in the majority that matters for the impact of female
representation.
4. Causality
The question of causality naturally arises in this type of study. Is it the share of women in the
local council that affects spending decisions, or is there an underlying factor that determines
both? The striking result that the effect differs between municipalities governed by a left- and
right-wing majority in a fashion predicted by the preference study makes the results more
reliable. However, the possibility of endogeneity still remains. If endogeneity occurs through
an unobservable municipality-specific effect, the problem disappears when using the within
                                                                                                                                                                            
12 Dividing the sample by majority leads to no statistically significant results.16
estimator or the GMM estimator. Thus, endogeneity may only be a problem if some time-
varying variable simultaneously determines women’s representation and spending decisions.
4.1. The instrument
Optimally, one would like to consider a “natural experiment” in the form of a truly
exogenous change of female representation or find a variable that is correlated with women’s
representation but not with spending decisions.
13 A change to the municipality that may affect
female representation is a change in the number of seats in the local council. In the three
elections included in this study, the probability for a nominated man to be elected was greater
then for a nominated woman, as men were placed higher up on the party lists (Statistics
Sweden (1999)). An increase of the number of seats is thus likely to have increased the
chance of women being elected when nominated.
An increase to the number of seats may thus be a relevant instrument. But is it exogenous?
Indeed it is the local councils themselves that determine the size of the councils. However, the
minimum number of seats is stipulated by law and depends on the number of voters in the
municipality.
14 Moreover, the decision to change the number of seats must be taken before the
end of March in the election year (almost 6 months before next election), and the change will
be implemented the coming election period (Kommunallagen 5 Chapter 1-3 §).
15
A possible problem with this instrument is that it may correlate with the demand for the
different services. Growing municipalities may have an increasing share of children relatively
to elderly, and thus growing demand for childcare and education relative to elderly care. On
the other hand, the law only requires a larger number of seats when the number of voters (not
inhabitants) in the municipality exceeds a certain threshold. And indeed, if one examines the
change of municipalities’ demographic composition in the period preceding the change of
seats in the council there seems to be no such correlation. The change in the share of
population between the age of 0-6 in the period 88-91(91-94) is not correlated with the
                                                       
13 See Pande (1999) and Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2001) for examples of studies attempting to make use of an
experiment.
14 The number of seats should be odd and at least 31 in municipalities with less then 12 000 voters, 41 in
municipalities with 12 000 - 24 000 voters, 51 in municipalities with 24 000-36 000 voters, 61 in municipalities
with more then 36 000 voters, and 101 in the local council in Stockholm.
15 I have asked the municipalities when the decision was taken and the answers indicate that the decision to
change the number of seats often is taken between a year and 6 months before the election.17
percent change of the number of seats in the local council 1992(1995). Continuing this
correlation for all the age categories I find that they are all very week. If anything, the change
in the share of elderly is positively correlated and the share of school children negatively
correlated with the change of seats. The instrument thus does not appear to pick up lagged
changes in demand.
Another concern may be that municipalities decreasing the number of seats do so to lower
spending. Thus, a change in the number of seats could be positively correlated with change in
the overall budget. If the decrease in the budget hits different sector asymmetrically, the
change in council seats may be correlated with spending in different sectors. However, there
is no significant correlation between changes in the budget and changes of the number of seats
in the council.
Since the probability of being elected once nominated was greater for men then women
during this period, a sudden increase (decrease) in the number of seats should increase
(decrease) the chance for women to be elected. Moreover, this effect is likely to differ across
municipalities. Studies on national and international level suggest that women do best in
multi-member constituencies with a high number of seats per district (Norris and Lovenduski
(1995)). In the context of Swedish local councils, this would imply that a sudden change in
the number of seats would have a greater impact on female representation in smaller local
councils. Further, since right-wing majorities consist of up to four parties whereas left-wing
majorities include only two parties, the effect should be larger in local councils with a right-
wing majority. A change to the number of seats in the local council is therefore expected to
have greatest impact on female representation in small local councils with a right-wing
majority. In total I make use of four different instruments for the share of women in the
majority: percent change of seats in; small right-wing majority; small left-wing majority;
large right-wing majority; and large left-wing majority local councils. A problem is that there
have not been many changes during the three election periods included in the study. When
using the share of women in the majority as proxy for female representation, there are 35 (out
of 879) changes in the number of seats.18
4.2. Results
The results in Table 9 indicate that there is indeed an independent effect of female
representation on childcare and education verses elderly care spending. Both female
representation in this and in the previous period are significant.
16 Compared to any previous
results the point estimates are now much larger, suggesting elasticities that are from 3 to 6
times larger then before. A 10 percent increase of women in the majority leads to a long-term
increase of about 5 percent increase of spending on childcare relative to elderly care. A
possible explanation for this larger effect is that younger politicians may also be placed
further down the party list and as a result the instrument may pick up the effect of both gender
and age. If the instruments are only weakly correlated with the endogenous explanatory
variable, then even a weak correlation between the instruments and the error can lead to large
inconsistency in IV estimates (Bound et al (1995)). The F statistics of the instruments in the
first-stage estimations, reported in Table 9, suggest that the instruments are indeed correlated
with female representation. Moreover, the Hansen overidentifying test indicates that there is
no problem with correlation between the instrument and the error in the original equation.
When also instrumenting for the lagged dependent variable using the techniques described in
section 3.3.2 female representation is only significant on spending on childcare relative to
elderly care. I have also run the same regressions using only one observation every election
period (reducing the time periods to 4). Dynamics is a less present in these specifications
suggesting that the lagged dependent variable can be excluded. These results support the
conclusion from Table 9: Female representation has a positive exogenous effect on spending
on childcare and education verses elderly care.
Since the effect of female representation should differ between right and left-wing majorities,
I have also tried to divided the sample by majority. Female representation enters as predicted
in right-wing majorities but the effects in left-wing majorities are not statistically significant
on conventional levels. One plausible explanation is that the change of seats in the local
council is a poor instrument in small left-wing majority councils. Examining the first-stage
regressions more closely indicate that the effect of the change of seats in the local council on
female representation is, as predicted, strongest in small right-wing local councils and
                                                       
16 The other proxy for female representation, the share of women in the council, has roughly the same effect as
the share of women in the majority. The results are not displayed to save space.19
somewhat weaker in larger local councils. However, there seems to be no impact of a change
of seats in small left-wing majority councils. Either it is a result of the limited number of
changes of seats in the local councils, or the above reasoning for using the change of seats in




5. Response  to  Shocks
When ranking the municipalities according to the share of women in the local council there is
little variation over time. Thus, some municipalities always have a relatively large share of
women in the council and some municipalities never do. Consequently, there may be
additional effects of female representation which are difficult to uncover in a fixed effects
estimation since they can not be separated from other time-invariant municipality specific
features. One way to uncover such hidden effects is to ask whether municipalities respond
differently to similar shocks, depending on the female representation in the council. This part
of the analysis focuses on expenditure on childcare relative to elderly care, since women
relative to men in both left-wing and right-wing parties regarded childcare as the more
important sector. Notice that this section is quite tentative and can be seen as a first attempt to
look for empirical regularities rather than as formally testing a well-specified hypothesis.
5.1 Unobservable shocks
It is plausible that some shocks, political and economic events, affect all municipalities in
Sweden. Examples could be changes in the municipality’s responsibilities, business cycle
effects and political changes in national government. Suppose that these changes are difficult
to measure or cannot be observed. In a recent paper, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) suggests
                                                       
17 This can perhaps explain why there is no effect of female representation on spending on education relative to
elderly care when the lagged dependent variable is instrumented for using the techniques described in section
3.3.2. If the instruments only work for right-wing majorities there should be no effect on spending on education
verses elderly care because men and women’s preferences did no differ across those sectors in right-wing parties.20
what statistical method to use in a case like this. Persson and Tabellini (2001) use the same
methodology when studying the effect of political institutions on economic policy.
Following their method I would like to estimate the specification:
yit =α + βzit + (1+η ( zit - zt )) ϕλt + γ Xit + vi + εit
yit denotes, as in the panel specification, the spending outcome in a municipality in a
particular year, zit is the proxy for women’s bargaining power in the local council, Xit is the
vector of control variables specified in section 3 and vi is the municipality specific effect. As
before, the set of year dummies are used to estimate the common effect of common events.
Now, the institution specific effect of common events λt is proportional to η( zit - zt ) where zt
is the year average across municipalities. Thus, if municipalities with a large share of women
in the ruling majority react differently to shocks the estimated coefficient η will be
significant. Because of the form of the specification, η has to be estimated using non-linear
least squares.
5.2 Observable shocks
Another approach is to focus on different spending responses to changes in observable
variables, which should have an effect on spending decisions. Here I concentrate on
demographic changes and different dynamic adjustment processes. To investigate these
questions, the institutional variable – the deviation of share of women in the majority from
year mean – is interacted with the demographic variables and the lagged dependent variable.
The specification becomes:
yit = α￿+ βzit + (µ+ η ( zit - zt )) Sit +γ Xit + λt + vi + εit
This is identical to the earlier expression except for Sit, which include the lagged dependent
variable and the demographic variable. Instead of using the different age groups a new
demographic variable (the number of inhabitants in the age 0-6 divided by age 65 and older
(DEM)) is constructed. The coefficient η will be estimated using the fixed effects estimator.21
5.3 Results
The results, presented in the two first columns of Table 10, indicate that municipalities with
greater female representation respond differently to the unobservable shocks.
18 Over the
period all municipalities have decreased spending on childcare relative to elderly care and
municipalities with a greater share of women in the local council have decreased spending
even more than other municipalities. Thus, the effect of female representation goes the
opposite direction to the effect found earlier in the study. This result looks interesting, but is
hard to interpret without a prior hypothesis. To judge the size of the effect, consider a
municipality with a share of women in the majority one standard deviation from mean. How
much more did this municipality decrease spending on childcare relative to elderly care in
comparison to the mean municipality? The short-term effect is 0.2 to 0.3 percent and the long-
term effect is 0.3 to 0.5 percent depending on proxy for female representation. Although local
governments with a larger share of women respond stronger to the unobservable negative
shocks on spending on childcare relative to elderly care, the share of women in the local
majority still has a positive direct impact on the spending ratio. The effect is only statistically
significant in the seciónd column.
The last two columns display the results of the effect of observable shocks. The estimates in
the first specification indicate that municipalities with stronger female representation are
associated with more inertia in spending than other municipalities. The results in the last
column suggest that they respond more to demographic shocks. Again female representation
has a positive direct impact on the spending on childcare relative to elderly care.
[Table 10 here]
The results from this section indicate that the composition of the local council can influence
how they react to different types of shocks. Although the results are interesting they call for a
theory that can give a direct hypothesis to take to the data.
                                                       
18 In spite of the problems associated with the inclusion of a dynamic effect the lagged independent variable is
included, as section 4 showed that there is a significant dynamic effect present in the data.22
6. Conclusion
I have studied the question whether women’s representation has any effect on the actual
allocation of resources. First, this study confirms the general findings of other work that men
and women’s preferences differ (see e.g. Thomas (1991), Oskarson and Wängnerud (1995)
and Setzer, Newmann and Voorhees Leighton (1997)). Specifically, it finds that women,
compared to men, prefer more spending on childcare relative to elderly care. In left-wing
parties women express a stronger preference than men for education relative to elderly care,
but no such difference is found in right-wing parties. Secondly, the results show that female
representation matters for the allocation of the budget, as predicted when examining the
preferences. The results are summarized in Table 11.  More generally, the results contradict
the prediction from the Downsian model that the politician’s identity, or in this case gender,
should not influence policy decisions.
[Table 11 here]
The paper also provides indirect evidence on the decision process in the local council.
Specifically, I employ two proxies for women’s bargaining power in the local council. Most
results indicate that it is the representation in the majority, rather than the whole council, that
matters. Because of the high correlation between the two, other results are inconclusive.
Finally, the paper makes an effort to identify non-linear effects of female representation on
municipality spending. The results differ somewhat depending on proxy for female
representation, but the they suggest that municipalities with a large share of women in the
council seem to be associated with greater inertia in spending and respond more to
demographic shocks than municipalities with a lower share of women in the council.
The focus here has been on gender as a determinant of spending. Clearly, the composition of
the local council in other dimensions should also have an effect on policy. For example, a
municipality with older politicians is likely to spend more on the elderly ceteris paribus. Other
characteristics, such as ethnic group and occupation may also be correlated with preferences
and therefore have an impact on policy decisions. There is clearly room for further studies
along similar lines.23
Appendix
Question from the survey of local government politicians
(Kommunalpolitikerundersökningen 1993 SSD 0459).
For each of the three sectors, childcare, education and elderly care, the respondents answered
the following question:
Do you think that it is important that your municipality does more than at present, or its effort
is essentially sufficient as it is, or if the municipality’s effort can be reduced, or if you do not
have an opinion.
A.  Important to do more
B.  Sufficient as it is
C.  Can be reduced
D.  Do not know / no opinion.
(Own translation)
Table A:1 Descriptive statistics for study in section 2
Variable Mean Standard deviation N obs
Female 0.316 0.465 1067
Age 51.185 10.006 1067
Childcare/ Elderly care 2.666 0.664 1034
Childcare/ Education 2.703 0.658 1036
Education/ Elderly care 2.960 0.653 1035
Data source: Kommunalpolitikerundersökningen 1993 SSD 0459
.24
Table A:2. Data description and descriptive statistics for study in section 3
Variable Mean Std.d N obs
Data source:
Swedish Association of Local Authorities  “Vad kostar
verksamheten i din kommun?” 1988-1997
Childcare /elderly care: Spending on childcare divided by spending on
elderly care.
0.801 0.643 2730
Childcare /education: spending on childcare divided by spending on
education.
0.469 0.123 2729




Swedish statistics ( www.scb.se) “Sveriges officiella statistik”
Women in the local council: The number of women in the local council
divided by the number of seats in the local council.
0.352 0.076 2780
Women in the majority: The number of women in the majority divided
by the number of seats belonging to the majority. There is a left-wing
majority if SAP + VP obtains more than 50 percent of the votes and a
right-wing majority if M +Fp+Kd+C obtain more than 50 percent of the
votes.
0.357 0.100 2139
Left-wing votes: The share of votes cast on SAP and VP. 0.473 0.122 2780
Ages 0-6: The share of the population between 0 and 6. 0.091 0.010 2780
Ages 7-16: The share of the population between 7 and 16. 0.125 0.014 2780
Ages 17-19: The share of population between 17 and 19. 0.040 0.005 2780
Ages 65-79: The share of population between the ages 65 and 79. 0.139 0.029 2780
Ages 80 and older: The share of population older then 80. 0.047 0.013 2780
Population density: Population divided by area. 111.610 377.035 2780
Women with higher education: The number of women with three years
or more of higher education divided by the population.
0.021 0.010 2780
Women in the population: The share of women in the population. 0.499 0.033 2780
Change of number of seats in the council -0.002 0.033 2780
Data on all the above variables are from the beginning of the year.
Data source:
Swedish Statistics “Årsbok för Sveriges kommuner” 1990-
2000
Mean income:  Taxable personal income per person.  Deflated using KPI
to 1991 years prices.
8233.9 11143.5 2780
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            Table 1. Politicians preferences over sectors. Ordinal































N obs. 1034 1036 1035




            *** Indicate statistical significance at 1%-level, ** at 5%-level
            and  * at 10%-level. t-statistics in parentheses.  All regressions
            include municipality dummies and are reported with robust
            standard errors.
           Table 2. Left-wing politicians preferences over sectors.
























N obs. 481 480 481




            *** Indicate statistical significance at 1%-level, ** at 5%-level
            and  * at 10%-level. t-statistics in parentheses.  All regressions
            include municipality dummies and are reported with robust
            standard errors.30
              Table 3. Right-wing politicians preferences over sectors.






















N obs. 553 556 554




*** Indicate statistical significance at 1%-level, ** at 5%-level
            and  * at 10%-level. t-statistics in parentheses.  All regressions
            include municipality dummies and are reported with robust
            standard errors.
Table 4. Predicted effect of women's representation in local council on spending
Effect of women's representation  in the local council
Whole sample Left-wing parties Right-wing parties
Spending on childcare/elderly care + + +
Spending on childcare/education 0 0 0
Spending on education/elderly care + + 031



























































































N obs. 1698 1698 1698
Within R
2 0.867 0.190 0.892
*** Indicate statistical significance at 1%-level, ** at 5%-level and at 10%-level.
 t-statistics in parentheses. All specifications are in ln-form and include time-dummies.











































*** Indicate statistical significance at 1%-level, ** at 5%-level and at 10%-level. t-statistics in parentheses.
 All specifications include the same control variables as in Table 5.32







Specification A B A A









































N obs. 1663 1663 1661 1661







































N obs. 1625 1625 1624 1624
(i)  All specifications include the same control variables as in Table 5 and standard errors are 
robust. *** indicate statistical significance at 1%-level, ** at 5%-level and * at 10%-level.
(ii) The GMM estimates have been obtained using the software DPD for Ox 3.00.
(iii)  The GMM estimates are all one step.
(iv)  In specification A all explanatory variables are considered to be exogenous and in specification
B they are treated as predetermined.
a)  Sargan gives the test statistic and p-value of the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions.
The second step estimations is presented since the test statistic from the first-step has been
  shown to over-reject in the presence of heteroscedasticity. The null hypothesis is that the
instruments are valid/the model is correctly specified.
b)  AR2 is the test statistic and p-value for no second order correlation. The null hypothesis is 
that there is no second order serial correlation.33








Specification A B A A



























Childcare/ Education (-1) 0.616
***
(5.76)




















































































































N obs. 1663 1663 1661 1661
Same specifications as in Table 7. *** Indicate statistical significance at 1%-level, ** at  5%-level and * at
10%-level. See Table 7 for more information about the table.
a)  Sargan gives the test statistic and p-value of the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions. The null 
hypothesis is that the instruments are valid/the model is correctly specified.
b)  AR2 is the test statistic and p-value for no second order correlation. The null hypothesis is that there
is no second order serial correlation.Table 9. IV-regressions
Childcare/Elderly care Childcare/Education Education/Elderly care
FE FE FE FE FE FE







































b 0.17 0.33 0.68 1.67 0.51 0.33
FE FE FE FE FE FE







































b 4.36 1.63 7.19
* 1.14 0.38 0.81
(i)  *** Indicate statistical significance at 1%-level, ** at 5%-level and * at 10%-level.  t-statistic in
parentheses, errors are robust and the control variables are the same as in Table 7.
(ii)  FE stands for fixed effects and the instruments are the percent change in the number of seats in the local
council in; small left-wing majority; small right-wing majority; large left-wing majority and large right-wing
majority the local council. A local council is large if the number of seats is larger the 45 ( the median) and
otherwise it is small.
a) F statistic (and p-value) of the identifying instruments in the first-stage estimation.
b)         The test statistic is obtained by running the residuals from the second stage regression on the instruments
and multiplying the R
2 from this regression by the number of observations. Under the null hypothesis that
the instruments are not correlated with the error term, the test is distributed χ2 with (j-k) degrees of freedom,
where j is the number of instruments and k the number of variables instrumented for. Critical value for the
test (3 d.f.): 10%=6.25 and 5%=7.82Table 10. Effect of female representation on the response to shocks.
Unobservable shocks Observable shocks
NLS NLS FE FE


























































89 for a municipality
with a share of women
1 std. above mean in










N obs. 1544 1626 1544 1626
Adj. R
2 0.955 0.954 Within R
2 0.890 0.887
(i)  *** Indicate statistical significance at 1%-level, ** at 5%-level and * at 10%-level. The set of control
variables is the same as in Table 5.
(ii)  The specifications with unobservable shocks are estimated using non-linear least squares (NLS) and the
ones with observable shocks using fixed effects (FE).
(iii)  One std. in the share of women in the majority is 8.5 percent.
(iv)  (zit -zt) is the deviation of women in the majority from year mean.
(v)  DEM is the number of inhabitants in the age 0-6 divided by the number of inhabitants older than 65.1
Table 11. Predicted and actual effect of women's representation in local council on spending







Theory Data Theory Data Theory Data
The whole sample + + 0 0 + Mixed result
00
Left-wing parties + + 0 0 + +
00
R i g h t - w i n g  p a r t i e s ++0000